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Abstract: Health systems have repeatedly addressed concerns about efﬁciency
and equity by employing trans-national comparisons to draw out the strengths and
weaknesses of speciﬁc policy initiatives. This paper demonstrates the potential for
explicit historical analysis of waiting times for hospital treatment to add value to spatial
comparative methodologies. Waiting times and the size of the lists of waiting patients
have become key operational indicators. In the United Kingdom, as National Health
Service (NHS) ﬁnancial pressures intensiﬁed from the 1970s, waiting times have become
a topic for regular public and political debate. Various explanations for waiting times
include the following: hospital consultants manipulate NHS waiting lists to maintain
their private practice; there is under-investment in the NHS; and available (and
adequate) resources are being used inefﬁciently. Other countries have also experienced
ongoing tensions between the public and private delivery of universal health care in
which national and trans-national comparisons of waiting times have been regularly
used. The paper discusses the development of key UK policies, and provides a limited
Canadian comparative perspective, to explore wider issues, including whether ‘waiting
crises’were consciously used by policymakers, especially those brought into government
to implement new economic and managerial strategies, to diminish the autonomy and
authority of the medical professional in the hospital environment.
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Waiting lists have been a constant presence in the British National Health
Service (NHS) since its formation in 1948, and in many other general tax-
funded health systems including those in Canada, Australia, New Zealand
and the Nordic countries.1 There have been regular attempts to manage waiting
lists and the times people wait, especially for hospital inpatient treatment,
and ‘waiting’ has become a key operational indicator for health service
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1 Although it is common to talk about the British NHS, in reality there have been separate systems for
England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. In 1999 Welsh devolution created a separate NHS
Wales, so there are now four health services, with limited ‘UK’ co-ordination through Whitehall.
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performance.2 Explanations for the existence and size of waiting lists and length of
time waiting for treatment have included the inefﬁcient use of available resources,
underinvestment in the health service and clinicians manipulating their
productivity to maintain demand for private practice.
This paper offers the ﬁrst historical analysis of waiting for elective care in
the NHS. It uses ‘waiting’ to explore wider issues in the development of health
policy and delivery of health care, especially the changing authority of medical
professionals, health economists and health service management. It tests a broad
hypothesis that as pressures on NHS expenditure increased, especially from the
1960s (due to general economic crises as well as rising demand for more expensive
treatments by an ageing population) politicians responded by shifting the policy
focus from waiting lists to waiting times, and by forming new collaborations with
health economists, who beneﬁted professionally from the increased use of their
expertise. Medical professionals, in contrast, appeared to have little to bring to the
policy table on waiting lists/times, or little willingness or invitation to do so.
Some policy theorists have approached the issue of performance management in
health services through broad categorisation into ‘intelligence’, ‘targets’ and
‘rankings’ (Hood, 2007); others have focussed on how opportunities are created
(and taken) for policy change by considering actors, their collaborations and the
political climates in which they operate (Sabatier, 1988;Wilsford, 1994; Kingdon,
1995; Tuohy, 1999, 2017a, 2017b). None has adequately considered the role of
relative expert status, or how to accommodate the vital issue of ‘space’ (dynamic
impact of sub-national variations in performance) in evaluating NHS policy
development. Three key policy lessons emerge from the history of waiting lists and
times in the United Kingdom. First, a failure to acknowledge and address tensions
between the different NHS policy levels (intra-/inter-regional and national) will
affect the relative success of performance management techniques. Second, radical
policy changes should be piloted, even if this is uncomfortable/risky for policy-
makers. Third, conscious effort needs to be invested by policymakers in ensuring
all expert groups continue to be actively engaged in policy formation.
The following sections of this paper establish ﬁrst, the trajectory of waiting lists
and times in the UK NHS, and responses to them from three main groups of
actors: government ministers, medical professionals and health economists.
Second, it considers the points at which signiﬁcant policy changes on waiting lists
were proposed or attempted, and what factors inﬂuenced their relative uptake.
Third, it reﬂects on how variations in waiting lists and times expose the
‘sub-national’ nature of the British NHS; their active role in shaping services, and
2 Waiting ‘lists’ traditionally contained the names of those people whom specialists had decided
required in-patient treatment.Waiting ‘times’ canmean the length of time a patient has waited for admission
after the specialist has made the decision to treat them as an inpatient, but more recently in the United
Kingdom it has included the time waited after the general practitioner has referred the patient for a
specialist’s opinion.Waiting for other types of health care, such as in Emergency Departments or for general
practitioner appointments, is beyond the scope of this paper.
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what this can tell us about the validity and impact of targets and standards as
governance tools. Fourth, it offers some broader comment on the logic of com-
parative studies in health policy – and how ‘time’ (i.e. history) can be a valuable
analytic alongside ‘space’ (comparative studies) and ‘place’ (institutional studies),
and provides a brief overview of the Canadian history of waiting in health care.
Since waiting times are a notable feature of Beveridge-style health systems and the
British NHS is the oldest of these systems, this history offers policy relevance
beyond the United Kingdom.
The NHS: 1948–1979
When the NHS began on 5 July 1948, there were widespread concerns that there
would be queues outside hospitals and general practitioner (GP) surgeries of
patients with chronic health care needs. Queues did not form, but there have been
waiting lists ever since. The types of patients waiting has changed in line with
medical developments: waiting lists for thoracoplasty for TB disappeared with the
introduction of streptomycin in 1943; waiting lists for hip replacements did not
appear until John Charnley developed a successful hip prosthesis in 1962. Heart
attack patients who once went onto waiting lists for investigation now often go
straight to theatre from the ambulance. For elective surgery, which is one of the
largest items of NHS expenditure, selection of patients fromwaiting lists, and their
management in hospitals has remained the prerogative of the individual hospital
consultant, despite periodic attempts to introduce more transparent and objective
selection criteria and productivity targets.
Within a year of the start of the NHS, the Ministry of Health was consciously
addressing waiting lists and looking for ways to explain and reduce them. The ﬁrst
Circulars (government communications to NHS organisations) on waiting lists
asked hospitals to review their procedures and submit reports (Ministry of Health,
1949, 1954). The Nufﬁeld Provincial Hospitals Trust and the King Edward’s
Hospital Fund for London (health service thinktanks) undertook studies on
hospital efﬁciency – continuing a research interest that pre-dated the NHS. Some
hospital boards also chose to conduct their own waiting list studies, such as in
Cardiff in 1953–1954 (Grundy et al., 1956).
It was not until 1964 that the Ministry acknowledged an effect that economists
already recognised: that an increase in consultant stafﬁng to address the waiting
lists actually stimulated increased demand (Ministry of Health, 1965). Studies of
temporary policy solutions demonstrated that systems settled quickly into a new
equilibrium (Aldridge, 1965; Williams, 1968). Active manipulation of waiting
lists, and associated issues such as patients’ length of hospital stay, also depended
upon the willing engagement of the clinician. Yet as the Deputy Chief Medical
Ofﬁcer, Henry Yellowlees put it: ‘There can be no telling surgeons how long their
patients should be in hospital’. All that could be done was to put surgeons ‘in
possession of the facts’ [Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS), 1968].
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Enoch Powell, Minister of Health between 1960 and 1963, acknowledged the
realities of trying to meet inﬁnite demand, and the risks of unacknowledged
rationing. On the speciﬁc issue of waiting lists, Powell noted: “I cannot but reﬂect
sardonically on the effort I myself expended, as Minister of Health, in trying to
‘get the waiting lists down’. It is an activity about as hopeful as ﬁlling a sieve …
In a medical service free at the point of consumption the waiting lists, like the poor
in the Gospel, ‘are always with us’” (Powell, 1966: 39–40).
Waiting lists remained relatively steady between 435,000 and 491,000 through
the 1950s and early 1960s. From 1965 to 1973 they ranged between 510,000 and
549,000. The Ministry of Health and its successor from 1968, the DHSS, con-
ducted periodic surveys of waiting lists, occasionally uncovering evidence of
hospital manipulation of statistics. The 1971 review found that not all patients
who would beneﬁt from hospital treatment had been included, and that in some
hospitals patients classed as ‘urgent’ had been waiting for more than a year
(DHSS, 1971).
Waiting lists and private medicine in the NHS
The NHS, by the mid-1970s, was experiencing increasing ﬁnancial pressures. The
OPEC international oil crisis forced budget cuts across all public sector services,
and the DHSS fought hard to preserve the status quo for the NHS. The election of
a Labour government in 1974 reignited the debate over private medicine in the
NHS, which also impinged on the waiting lists issue. After 1963 there had been no
further speciﬁc Ministry/DHSS Circulars until 1975, which requested that
Regional Health Authorities actively manage their lists by checking whether
patients still needed surgery, and by sending data to the DHSS for national col-
lation (DHSS, 1975). Barbara Castle (Secretary of State for Health 1974–1976),
had ring-fenced £5 million of capital funding to address ‘bottlenecks’ in patient
treatment in 1975–1976.
To meet their election manifesto pledge to remove private medicine from NHS
hospitals, the government passed the Health Services Act in 1976 which estab-
lished a Health Services Board (HSB) to oversee a reduction in ‘pay beds’. Yet,
some of the demand for private medicine came from patients who wished to
bypass the NHS waiting lists. As part of negotiations the government had con-
ceded to the medical profession’s demand to abandon an end date for this process
in return for their acceptance common waiting lists (both NHS and private
patients).
The HSB’s report Common waiting lists for NHS and private patients in NHS
hospitals drew attention to the ‘wide variety of waiting list systems currently in
use (for example lists personal to consultants, lists common to a number of
consultants in a specialty, lists for particular conditions and booking or diary
systems)’. It recommended that ‘medical priority’ should be assessed according
to a broader set of determinants than purely ‘clinical condition’ (HSB, 1977).
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It provided a list of ‘common factors’ for consideration in managing the move-
ment of patients on waiting lists. These included:
i. Pain and discomfort suffered by the patient.
ii. The length of time the patient has spent seeking in-patient admission.
iii. The patient’s domestic circumstances including his dependency on community
support services (e.g. the effect his housing might have on his condition).
iv. The patient’s occupational circumstances (e.g. teachers seeking admission
during school holidays).
v. The patient’s willingness or ability to enter hospital at the time offered.
vi. The availability of hospital staff.
vii. The need to balance admissions for major and minor conditions to ensure
practical waiting lists and balanced nursing workloads.
viii. The need to admit patients with a variety of conditions to assist professional
teaching and training (particularly in teaching hospitals).
Health economics in the NHS
There is a clear relationship between the emergence of health economics as a distinct
academic discipline and profession in the United Kingdom, and rising concerns for
NHS efﬁciency and effectiveness. Despite the lack of a classical market, the NHS
provided a fertile testing ground for economic theory and from themid-1960s a small
group of economists chose to make it the focus of their research. Brian Abel-Smith
was the ﬁrst to applymethods of social accounting to theNHS through his role on the
1953–1956 Guillebaud inquiry (Sheard, 2013). Other economists who claimed the
NHS as their ﬁefdom included Jack Wiseman and Alan Williams, who developed a
health economics stronghold at the University of York soon after its foundation in
1963 and cultivated an inﬂuential research group, including Tony Culyer and Alan
Maynard – to name two of the most prominent.
In 1976 Tony Culyer published an article with John Cullis (lecturer in economics at
the University of Bath) in the Journal of Social Policy: ‘Some economics of hospital
waiting lists’ (Culyer and Cullis, 1976). They made the ﬁrst clear proposition that
emphasis should be switched from the number of patients on waiting lists to the
amount of time patients had to wait for treatment. Other economists had begun to
explore waiting time from a theoretical perspective (Nichols et al., 1971; Acton,
1975). The US economist Martin Feldstein (1964), whose Oxford PhD research was
on the NHS, had also attempted, with limited success, to use waiting list data as a
proxy for excess demand for inpatient care. Culyer and Cullis sought to consider
broader factors and to demonstrate that patients waiting for inpatient care really did
pay a time price for their pain and inconvenience. They called for the development and
use of a hospital admissions index to express quantitatively the patient’s need for care:
The necessary characteristics of such a concept include, ﬁrst, that it should enable patients
to be ranked by priority – a priority moreover, that is not lexicographic (in the sense that
some ‘needs’ dominate all others and must be fulﬁlled ﬁrst) but which allows components
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of the concept of need to be traded off at the margin. This immediately offers a challenge
to conventional waiting-list management today, in which clinical considerations often
dominate all others (Culyer and Cullis, 1976: 252).
Culyer and Cullis recognised that there were interdependencies between the
supply and demand sides of the waiting list problem, especially as the doctor
decided both what was to be demanded and supplied. The general practitioner
(GP) was key to this process, and research by the Institute of Hospital Adminis-
trators (IHA) (1963) in 1963 had already established that their referral practices
were sensitive to the length of inpatient waiting lists. Other studies had highlighted
wide variations in GP referral patterns, and their considerable discretion in
choosing which patients to refer and to which consultant (Forsyth and Logan,
1968; Ashford and Pearson, 1970; Hicks, 1972). At the admissions end in the
hospital, in the IHA survey of 82 hospitals in England and Wales, 50 replied they
had adopted agreed medical criteria for admission and 41 said no – that it was
dependent on individual consultant preferences.
Culyer and Cullis’ conclusion was that:
… no generally consistent criteria for referral and admission are currently employed in
the hospital service. This, in the context of the NHS, which is explicitly devoted to the
efﬁcient and fair allocation of health care resources, is an unsatisfactory state of affairs,
for the case that the doctors are not the only relevant arbiters of needs (or even the most
important arbiters) can easily be made in principle and it appears clearly to be the case
that they are not consistent anyway in practice (1976: 255).
It was not as though decision rules for admission did not exist: model schemes,
such as that by Luckman et al. (1969), had been developed in the late 1960s. They
produced a ‘priority index’ based on how long patients had been waiting and
urgency based on their expected deterioration and degree of disability. Culyer and
Cullis elaborated on these ideas, stressing that selection of variables for inclusion
in the index and the weights attached to them should be seen as policy decisions
that embodied particular value judgements: ‘They are not matters that can be
decided by social science (nor any other kind), nor are they matters, in our jud-
gement, that should be decided by persons without public accountability’ (1976:
258). Only one of their criteria was purely clinical: urgency based upon the
expected rate of deterioration of the patient’s condition. All criteria (with the
exception of time spent waiting on the list which was already available from
hospital records), required the use of scoring procedures. Culyer would have been
familiar with a similar scoring system that his York colleague Alan Williams was
then using to develop the quality adjusted life year (QALY) tool, based on the
work of Rosser and Watts (1972) (Williams, 1985). The added beneﬁt was that
scoring could be done by junior medical staff, and some of the categories could
even be completed by an administrator. To address concerns about maintaining
case balance for teaching purposes, some ﬂexibility in putting together theatre lists
could be retained by an ‘AdmittingOfﬁcer’. The index could also be used to ensure
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efﬁciency by choosing those patients who would beneﬁt most from hospital
treatment. It might result, for example, in the admission of two patients with
relatively short expected lengths of stay and low index scores rather than one
person with a long expected stay and a high index score.
More ambitiously, Culyer and Cullis envisioned their admissions index being
used to reduce inequalities between departments, hospitals and regions. This,
however, would require the establishment of national norms and ‘a substantial
reduction in the discretion of individual hospital doctors’ (Culyer and Cullis,
1976: 263). They concluded that attempts to regulate waiting lists and waiting
times by manipulation of indirect variables such as the bed stock, length of stay,
manpower and operating theatre capacity were unlikely to be very effective. These
missed the ‘crucial heart of the matter anyway, which is to ensure that admissions
should be conducted so far as possible in accordance with some basic principles of
efﬁciency and fairness’ (Culyer and Cullis, 1976: 264).
Culyer and Cullis’ (1976) paper was not a purely academic study. It was the
outcome of collaboration with the DHSS. The DHSS had established its own
Economic Advisers Ofﬁce in 1969, and was actively developing new modes of
engagement between its staff and university-based economists. Yet there appears
to have been a reluctance to be transparent about the use of external expertise:
Culyer and Cullis’ list of urgency criteria is almost identical that recommended in
the 1976 HSB report, but their advisory role was not acknowledged in it.
The impact of the HSB report was negligible. In July 1978 the HSB issued
further recommendations on moving to common waiting lists, but the medical
profession again refused, complaining about lack of consultation with the Joint
Consultants Committee. The Secretary of State for Health, David Ennals (1976–
1979), was not in a strong enough position to force the issue (Webster, 1996: 627).
In a new tack, the government set up a working party to study orthopaedic
waiting lists under the chairmanship of the surgeon Robert Duthie (1981). Its
report was also toothless, recommending internal district reviews. Meanwhile,
waiting lists continued to rise.
During this ﬁrst NHS period, 1948–1979, there was relatively little discussion of
waiting lists within the medical profession, if articles and correspondence in theBritish
Medical Journal (BMJ) and the Lancet are indicative. The BMJ carried just two letters
in the 1950s; three in the 1960s and 12 in the 1970s. Some were written by clinicians
offering practical solutions to problems they witnessed in their own hospitals, such as
non-attendance, unfeasibly short call-up periods, or a failure to allow consultants to
book their patients at outpatient clinics. Occasionally there is insightful dialogue
between clinicians through the letters pages (Choyce, 1971; Gardiner, 1971; Harris,
1971; Fitzgerald, 1972; Harris, 1972). Rarely, there were damming critiques of
hospital inefﬁciency, such as the Lancet editorial in 1976 that commented:
There are many reasons, apart from tradition, from continuing to write ‘to come again,
3 months’ in outpatient notes. Most are irrelevant to the health of the community.
Few could stand up to rational examination (Lancet, 1976: 301–302; Cox, 1977).
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1979–1997: NHS managerialism
The election in 1979 of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government heralded
the start of a new era of central, and more politicised, interventions in the NHS. A
new ‘managerialism’was cultivated, especially following the 1983 Grifﬁths report
which brought in general managers (Grifﬁths, 1983), and new analytical tools
developed by ‘technicians’ – economists, epidemiologists and others (Klein, 2013).
Exposure of the considerable variations in NHS practices was a key strategy of the
Conservative governments. The economist C.E.B. Frost (1980b), working in colla-
boration with the DHSS, established that the average waiting list per consultant was
around 160 patients, which represented approximately 2 months’ work. He warned
that the Culyer and Cullis points-based admissions index could lead to the ‘rationally
economising consultant’who would ‘divert resources to accumulate points under the
scheme as long as his value of the anticipated beneﬁt of inpatient care exceeds the
anticipated cost to him of earning the extra point…’ (Frost, 1980a: 6–7).
Frost proposed two alternatives: ﬁrst, the waiting list premium – the consultant
would receive payment according to the reduction in their waiting list. Second,
and the more attractive option – a discharge index –which would take account of
all the consultant’s clinical duties including outpatients’ appointments. Frost also
supported the potentially disruptive shift in analytical focus – from waiting list
numbers to waiting times:
Economists are not alone in trying to divert attention from waiting lists ﬁgures to waiting
times thereby encouraging a more meaningful discussion of cost-reducing measures. The
government clearly has a difﬁcult task. It has to encourage doctors to use medical
resources sparingly, and yet it has also to reassure taxpayers that their taxes have bought
them medical treatment as and when they require it … If we agree that much of the
concern expressed about waiting lists is really symptomatic, then possibly we can also
agree that the fundamental problem is one of selecting an appropriate incentive structure
for the consultants (Frost, 1980a: 7).
Studies – by health economists, and increasingly from health services management
experts using Operational Research methodologies – provided evidence that
governments could use to justify new policies to tackle waiting lists, both in the
United Kingdom and in other countries that had waiting lists but different forms
of health systems. Lindsay and Feigenbaum, for example, demonstrated that
waiting on a list was a cost because a ‘good’ (i.e. treatment) received later is worth
less than one received now (Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984; Globerman, 1991).
An NHS census on 31 March 1984 revealed that there were 692,945 patients
waiting to be admitted to hospital (in England), of whom 44,713 were classed as
‘urgent’. In total, 29,283 of the urgent patients had been waiting more than a
month, and 194,614 non-urgent waiting more than a year. The 1975 DHSS Circular
had set ‘recommendations’ for the NHS that urgent cases should be treated within a
month, and non-urgent within a year, and that health authorities should make
information on waiting lists available to GPs (DHSS, 1975).
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John Yates and his Inter-Authority Comparisons Consultancy group in the
Health Services Management Centre at the University of Birmingham established
a spectrum of consultant surgeon performance of between 200 and 1000 opera-
tions per annum, and a variation in orthopaedic waiting lists across NHS districts
from less than 100 to an extreme outlier of 4089 (Yates andWood, 1985; Davidge
et al., 1987). However, an inquiry by the National Audit Ofﬁce found some
hospitals left their operating theatres woefully underused, and up to 25% of their
acute beds regularly empty (National Audit Ofﬁce, 1987). The variability in per-
formance was undoubtedly linked to the variability of NHS Districts – from small
ones such as Rugby with a population of some 87,000 to neighbouring Leicester’s
860,000. These differences in need and resources exacerbated tensions between
central accountability and local decision making which were increasingly exposed
through regional reviews (Day and Klein, 1985).
In his book, Why are we Waiting? John Yates stated that “If any organisation
can make a mess of collecting data it is the NHS” (1987: 9). He found evidence of
hospital clerks losing patients’ appointment cards, and the national collation of
data were minimal and crude. The DHSS deposited its collations in the House of
Commons library, and considered that sufﬁcient for ‘publication’. In 1985 the
long-running Hospital Inpatient Enquiry, which generated the inpatient statistics,
was radically reformed. Yet no data had ever been collected on waits for outpatient
department appointments, and inpatient waiting lists excluded day surgery patients
and those with booked appointments.
The College of Health Guide to Waiting Lists
A response to the rising waiting lists, and their variation within regions and by
surgical specialties came from the College of Health, which Michael Young
founded in 1983. It was a non-proﬁt-making body intended to complement the
Royal medical colleges and give those on the receiving end of health care a source
of support (it published a regular magazine ‘Self Health’). The ﬁrst edition of
The Guide to Waiting Lists was issued by the college in May 1984, and was
updated annually until 1991 (College of Health, 1984).
In part, the Guide was created in response to a British Medical Association
(1984) survey of all NHS districts in England and Wales between April 1983 and
April 1984 that had found patients were waiting up to 3 years simply to get an
outpatients appointment.3 There was increasing concern that patients were seeking
private treatment to jump the lengthening NHS queues. Although the numbers were
not large – 81,000 private patientswere treated in theNHS in 1982 – it created ethical
dilemmas, especially for hospital consultants (College of Health, 1984).
TheGuide collated waiting time statistics (percentage waiting more than 1 year)
from each NHS district by the eight main surgical specialties. These were arranged
3 The information for Scotland and Northern Ireland was not comparable with England andWales – it
was collected at different intervals and in different formats.
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in comparative tables, showing districts with 20% shortest and longest waits,
enabling patients and their GPS to see if they would get faster treatment through a
referral to another NHS district, or even region. It also provided a list of questions
for the patient to ask the consultant to establish whether a private referral would
be of beneﬁt. The College of Health voiced concerns that increasing pressure on
the NHS would stop the prestigious London teaching hospitals accepting patient
referrals from around the country. The public were not routinely provided with
information on their rights of referral, or even advised that their travel costs could
be reimbursed. It concluded that ‘Best of all would be a computerised data bank,
with terminals in every GP’s surgery so that they could see just what the current
situation was in many hospitals before deciding which one to refer a patient to’
(College of Health, 1984: 26).
The Department of Health (DH; successor to the DHSS in 1988) did later
provide funding for a pilot study on computerised waiting list information system
for GPs and patients. However, it discontinued funding after the ﬁrst year. It
maintained a policy of targeting waiting lists by short-term injections of ﬁnancial
resources. Beginning in 1985, the Waiting List Initiative spent £252 million until
its termination in 1995. The Secretary of State for Health, Norman Fowler (1983–
1987), authorised an additional £30 million investment between September 1987
and March 1988 to reduce the list by 100,000. However, the list actually grew
over that period from 690,000 to 704,000, an increase of 1.9% (Klein, 2013).
In 1990, 100 new consultant posts were created, ignoring strong evidence from
health economists that this would lead to further supplier-induced demand.
1991–1997: impact of the NHS internal market
The NHS underwent major reform enabled by the 1990 National Health Service
and Community Care Act which created the ‘Internal Market’ of purchasers and
providers. Performance indicators, introduced in the 1980s, became signiﬁcant
drivers in improving NHS efﬁciency. In 1991 a Patient’s Charter established a
right to treatment within 2 years of diagnosis: a signiﬁcant commitment to shift
the target from number of patients on waiting lists to waiting times (Secretary of
State for Health, 1991). As with other policy initiatives, it was developed in an
‘evidence vacuum’ with no acknowledgement of what was by this stage a con-
siderable amount of research, especially from the health economics community,
on how waiting lists developed. The NHSManagement Executive from 1991 sent
out annual guidance on priorities, requiring health authorities to deliver reduc-
tions in waiting times. Wide variations in GP practices were still common: rates of
referral ranged from 2.5 to 5.4 per 100 consultations and from 4.3 to 13.2 per 100
patients on GP lists. GP fundholding did little to change referral patterns (Farrow
and Jewell, 1993: 67; Surrender et al., 1995). Access to hospital care seemed
to be ‘largely a function of how individual GPs interpret their gatekeeping role’
(Klein et al., 1996: 85). Some of this was due to GP competence and conﬁdence.
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John Fry (1978) noted that he reduced his referral rate from 105 to 47 per 1000
patients over 25 years, and attributed this to his improving diagnostic competence, as
well as knowledge of hospital consultant capabilities.
In a new policy tack, the DH began to publish comparative hospital data in the
form of an annual guide that gave star ratings for individual hospitals. One of the
criteria for rating was the size of the waiting list (NHS Executive, 1994). The DH
also initiated routine use of clinical audit to demonstrate clinical effectiveness, but
this drive for efﬁciency depended on the cooperation of the medical profession
(Kerrison et al., 1994: 185; Day et al., 1998).4 The 1991 reforms reinforced
the continued dependence of the government and NHS managers on clinicians,
rather than permitting a signiﬁcant shift in authority (Aaron and Schwarz, 1984).
Ministers and managers could “shelter behind the doctrine of clinical judgement
… doctors in turn internalised scarcity in their judgements about appropriateness
[of treatment]” (Klein, 2013: 176).
Amore interventionist policy for waiting lists was sanctioned by the Secretary of
State for Health, William Waldegrave (1991–1995), who commissioned John
Yates’ Inter-Authority Comparisons Consultancy to work with the 22 worst
performing NHS districts. Their micro-management project cost £9 million,
which was subsequently calculated as a price of £1 million per 2000 reduction in
list size. The government quietly abandoned the initiative (BMJ, 1991; Yates,
1991; BMJ, 1992). Under such intense scrutiny, some districts adopted devious
tactics: NorthWest Thames was found to have abolished its varicose veins waiting
list; some districts made patients wait longer for outpatient appointments to try to
‘stop the clock’, or temporarily suspended their admission (Pope, 1992).
Academic research demonstrated that supply side factors were also signiﬁcant,
and highlighted that hospital consultants were still managing their lists using
obscure priorities (Propper, 1990; Iverson, 1993, 1997). Although most hospitals
operated a three point scale of urgency – immediate, urgent and non-urgent – there
was no clear understanding of how consultants interpreted these deﬁnitions
(Evans, 1990; Harvey, 1993). Stephen Frankel and Robert West claimed that
this opaqueness over waiting lists permitted “a blurring of the National Health
Service’s capacity for or commitment to certain sorts of treatment. Waiting lists
veil the discrepancies between what is offered and what can be done”. They
compared waiting lists to a mortlake formed by a fast ﬂowing river, in which
patients with ‘uninteresting’ surgical needs such as varicose veins and hernias
languished (Frankel and West, 1993: 44–62). A study of consultant prioritisation
practices undertaken by Alistair Lack and Sarajane Fletcher (Lack & Fletcher,
1995) at Salisbury hospital found that the most important factor considered was
the progression of the disease, alongside lesser factors such as degree of pain and
disability and the effect on the patient’s capacity to function.
4 The medical profession’s self-regulation of audit was a sign of some easing of pressure during Stephen
Dorrell’s tenure as Secretary of State for Health (1995–1996).
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1997: New Labour
The ‘New’ Labour government under Tony Blair from 1997 introduced a much
tougher approach to the NHS through the use of formal performance manage-
ment. As Rudolf Klein neatly puts it: ‘If priorities were the language of Socialism
(according to Aneurin Bevan), targets were the language of New Labour’ (Klein,
2013: 201). The Labour party had prioritised NHS efﬁciency in their election
manifesto, making a speciﬁc promise to cut the waiting list of 1,160,000 by
100,000 in their ﬁrst year in ofﬁce. In total, £500 million was made available to
tackle related issues, through greater use of the private sector and ﬁnancial
incentives for hospitals in a ‘payments by results’ strategy. However, by March
1998 the waiting list had grown to 1,297,000 and the Secretary of State for
Health, Frank Dobson (1997–1999), found himself the butt of political andmedia
jokes. Although there was subsequently a recorded improvement, it later emerged
that this had been manipulated by increasing the (unmonitored) time patients
waited before their ﬁrst hospital appointment. The National Audit Ofﬁce found
that waiting list statistics had been ‘inappropriately adjusted’ in nine trusts
(Comptroller and Auditor-General, 2001). A follow up spot check of 41 trusts by the
Audit Commission (2003) found evidence of deliberate mis-reporting at three trusts
and reporting errors in 30% of all waiting list performance indicators examined.
In 1998 a study by the British Medical Association’s Health Policy and
Economic Research Unit (1998) advocated for the adoption of a priority scoring
system such as that used in New Zealand (from 1996) and Sweden (Hadorn and
Holmes, 1997; Fricker, 1999). This was supported by research done over the
previous two decades by health economists and management experts (Feldman,
1994). It was noted that UK local authorities had long used priority scoring
effectively for allocating public sector housing (Edwards, 1997). And there were
some clinicians willing to undertake pilot studies in collaboration with econo-
mists. At Guy’s hospital in London Claire Gudex and Alan Williams applied a
scoring system for patients’ expected net QALY and used it to rank surgical
conditions (Gudex et al., 1990; Lack and Smith, 1995; Lack et al., 2000).
Although there were difﬁculties with clustering of conditions for preparing oper-
ating theatre lists, a study at Carmarthen hospital showed that this could be
overcome by introducing a patient initial quotient to determine whether a patient
should be placed on a list and an algorithm to reﬂect time waited which led to a
more balanced case mix. A modelling exercise at Salisbury hospital showed that
applying a ‘Points Scheme’ to a ‘ﬁrst come ﬁrst served’ orthopaedic waiting
list produced considerable changes in the order of patients to be treated: only
seven patients appeared in the ﬁrst 20 patients selected under both schemes.
The Salisbury scheme required fewer resources to treat its ﬁrst 20 patients, but
eliminated fewer days of waiting from the list (Edwards, 1999). These studies
highlighted the need to consider wider philosophical and ethical issues, including
whether clinicians would ‘game’ a priority points system for their patients’ beneﬁt.
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As the health economist Rhiannon Tudor Edwards noted about priority scoring
systems in 1999:
Nevertheless, before their widespread introduction we need to evaluate their dynamic
effects over time on case mix, distribution of waiting times, and patterns of resource use.
This will involve looking within the ‘black box’ of NHS waiting list management to ﬁnd
out far more about the beliefs and behaviour of those involved in the delivery and receipt
of elective health care in the NHS (Edwards, 1999: 413).
2000: from waiting lists to waiting times
In 2000 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown announced a ‘step
change in resources’ to coincide with the publication of the NHS plan. This
included a radical shift from monitoring by numbers on waiting lists to lengths
of waiting times. An ambitious target was set to reduce maximum waiting time
(from placement on inpatient list) from around the current 18 months to
6 months by the end of 2005 (and 13 weeks for an outpatient appointment).
This was a phased target, with annual goals: 15 months by 2003; 12 months by
2003 and 9 months by 2004. Alan Milburn, Secretary of State for Health
(1999–2003), declared a ‘war on waiting’. His understanding of the complex-
ities of NHS waiting appeared limited, judging from his use of supermarket
queuing analogies, but it did not detract from a very aggressive campaign
focussed on NHS staff, especially hospital managers, who were subjected to
harassing phone calls from DH as a part of a concerted ‘Targets and Terror’
strategy for punishing those who failed to meet waiting time targets. This was
likened to the targets set for managers of state enterprises in the USSR (Bevan
and Hood, 2006; Propper et al., 2008).
Yet although waiting times did begin to fall, research showed little actual
increase in overall hospital activity: targets were being met by distorting clinical
priorities – taking the longest waiters in advance of those with more urgent clinical
needs (Harrison and New, 2000). The government had also come to a concordat
with the private sector and used Independent Sector Treatment Centres for block
contracts of hip replacements, and other relatively uncomplicated surgical pro-
cedures. Private medicine was alive and well in NHS hospitals, and now actively
encouraged by New Labour: it brought in revenue for the NHS and provided an
incentive for some consultants to stay within the system.
Health economists responded to this signiﬁcant policy shift from waiting lists to
times by critiquing the choice of analysis the DHwas performing internally and/or
commissioning (often from their academic units). To them, it was not clear that
the right questions were being asked of a health care system that appeared to be in
a chronic state of ﬁnancial breakdown: there was little focus on bigger issues such
as how much to spend on what sorts of treatments, and who should have priority
in what was clearly a rationed (by waiting) system. Intermittent international
comparative studies highlighted the opportunities offered by robust and transparent
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priority setting systems, such as that used in New Zealand (Cullis et al., 2000; Devlin
et al., 2002a, 2002b; Martin et al., 2003; Appleby et al., 2005).
Politicians appeared to prefer tinkering through relatively minor adjustments to
the monitoring of waiting, rather than attempting to introduce new schemes to
achieve efﬁciency through prioritisation. John Reid (Secretary of State 2003–
2005) changed the statistical goalposts by requiring hospitals to report on Referral
to Treatment Time (RTT), which covered the whole ‘patient pathway’ from GP
referral, rather than from when a hospital consultant placed a patient on a list for
admission to hospital. The NHS Modernisation Agency (founded in 2000)
worked with hospital trusts to use new tools such as Patient Tracking Lists. A new
RTT target of 18 weeks was set. Reporting was now to include all elective care,
including booked cases. More ambitious targets were set for high priority services
such as cancer and heart disease. The statistics published following the introduc-
tion of these new targets showed clear quarterly peaks in admissions, coinciding
with dates of hospital reporting to DH. Admissions managers practiced ‘gaming’
by temporarily suspending patients from lists, and reinserting them after the
reporting dates.
Meticulous, sustained analyses by health economists such as Carol Propper
et al. (2008) demonstrated how within the new internal market culture of the
NHS, pressure to meet waiting targets (which were measured and thus a factor in
fundholder referrals) were prioritised, and which resulted in declines in unmea-
sured quality (as expressed in their study of acute myocardial infarction mortal-
ity). Another component of the internal market – the option for patients to choose
their place of treatment (fully operational from 2005) – could have helped to level
out the extreme of waiting times between NHS authorities. Yet early evaluation
found that the majority of patients preferred to use their local hospital, and were
prepared to sacriﬁce quicker access for longer waits at hospitals they were familiar
with because of proximity or reputation (Taylor et al., 2004; Burge et al., 2005;
Lewis and Appleby, 2008).
In 2009 the last signiﬁcant target of a maximum 18 week GP referral to treat-
ment in hospital was achieved. Since then, the pattern has remained one of inter-
mittent short-term ﬁreﬁghting to keepwithin target time range, but the numbers of
patients waiting has increased, and now stands at some 3.4 million (Campbell,
2017). And on 31 March 2017, the Chief Executive of the NHS for England,
Simon Stevens, announced that the 18 week target for some surgical procedures
(hip or knee replacement, cataract removal, hernia repair and other non-urgent
conditions) would have to be ‘relaxed’ to divert resources to parts of the health
service with greater need (mental health, GP access, cancer services).
‘Space’: waiting as an international comparative analysis tool
The history of waiting policies can also illuminate the development of the inter-
national comparative analysis in health care. Although policy theorists such as
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Theodore Marmor et al. (2005) have been sceptical of the genuineness of much
scholarly activity that claims to be comparative analysis, the salient point is that
such activities have not shown a linear progression. Although there were early
pioneers, such as Brian Abel-Smith who began consultancy work for the World
Health Organisation in 1956 (producing a comparative study of health care
expenditure in six countries), there were relatively few adopters until the 1990s
(Sheard, 2013). The history of international comparisons, and why they seemed
more attractive then, rather than during the ﬁscal crises of the mid-1970s and
mid-1980s, deserves further analysis.
Waiting for inpatient treatment did not receive systematic international com-
parative analysis until the Waiting Times Project conducted by Luigi Siciliani and
Jeremy Hurst at the Health Policy Unit of OECD in 2001–2003 (Hurst was on
secondment from the UKDH) (Siciliani andHurst, 2003, 2005). Their 12-country
study demonstrated that both supply and demand policies could reduce waiting
times, but could also provoke tension between clinicians and policymakers. They
also found preliminary evidence that increased private health insurance coverage
reduced waiting times. National waiting lists problems also allowed health
economists to broaden their international horizons, as evidenced by citations of
foreign studies in their academic papers and consultancy briefs for government
departments. For waiting policy in the United Kingdom, the gaze frequently
turned to Canada, Scandinavian countries and New Zealand, and the gaze was
returned from these countries (Appleby et al., 2005; Willcox et al., 2007).
Waiting for inpatient treatment in Canada
This brief overview of one of these regular ‘comparator’ countries –Canada – puts
the UK waiting history into perspective. Although the adoption of a Medicare
system in 1960s established a form of universal health care coverage, there was
scope for considerable variation at the provincial level, and the issues of length-
ening waiting lists and geographical equity emerged as a signiﬁcant policy and
political issue in the 1980s and stimulated a range of solutions. For example, the
waiting list crisis for coronary artery bypass surgery in Ontario led to the creation
of the Cardiac Care Network (Naylor, 1991). In British Columbia a similar
problem led to a contractual arrangement between the Ministry of Health and
four Seattle (US) hospitals to provide surgery for up to 200 cardiac patients a year
(Katz et al., 1991). Alberta and Quebec also had lengthy queues for cardiac
surgery and paediatric services. Some very personal accounts made media
headlines and heightened pressure on politicians to take action, as in 1990 when
several patients in British Columbia died while on a waiting list for heart surgery
(DeCoster et al., 1999).
Waiting lists have often been portrayed in Canada, as in the United Kingdom, as
a symptom of inadequate funding. Provincial governments found to their cost
that reducing resources for diagnostic tests led to lengthening wait times for
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elective surgery. There were increasing concerns about overcrowding in Emer-
gency Departments and in other parts of the Medicare system. Despite ad hoc
increased in resources, often targeted at speciﬁc procedures such as hip replace-
ments, ongoing uncertainties underpinned calls for radical reforms of how health
care is delivered, such as those issued by the Frazer Institute. Yet detailed studies
demonstrated that this was not always a system wide, or national issue. In Nova
Scotia, for example, in the late 1990s, waits for some services including hip and
knee replacements had in fact fallen (Nova Scotia, 1997). This uncertainty over
the accuracy of waiting list data led to Health Canada commissioning a report in
1998 to review and synthesise information. It found widespread interest in and
support for standardising data and coordinating waiting lists, and that signiﬁcant
investment was needed in waiting list infrastructure (McDonald et al., 1998).
The Western Canada Waiting List Project, which reported in 2001, drew on
international expertise, including John Yates from the United Kingdom and David
Hadorn from New Zealand. In total, 19 partner organisations collaborated to
develop scoring tools for admissions priority setting. Signiﬁcantly, members of the
public were involved in this process, helping to establish concepts of need and
importantly, fairness in access to health care. Many of the public participants had
no idea that there was no national system of waiting list management, or collec-
tion of data on waiting (Western CanadaWaiting List Project, 2001; Noseworthy
et al., 2003). In 2002 the Canadian government invested $5.5billion to decrease
waiting times as part of a 10-year strategy. In 2005 health ministers produced six
waiting time benchmarks for speciﬁc procedures that had been identiﬁed in the
2004 10-year plan (Marchildon, 2013). In 2007 Prime Minister Stephen Harper
announced that all provinces and territories would establish patient waiting time
guarantees by 2010 for up to ﬁve key treatments: cancer care, hip and knee
replacement, cardiac care, diagnostic imaging, cataract surgery and primary care.
Health care in Canada has also struggled with issues of gatekeeping and the role
and impact of private medicine. A study of waiting times for cataract surgery in
Manitoba demonstrated that waiting lists were longer in districts that permitted
surgeons to practice in both public and private arenas, but it also found that the
public had little accurate understanding about trends in waiting, and were often
misinformed by thinktanks such as the Fraser Institute which were supportive of a
move towards a more marketised health care system (DeCoster et al., 1999). In
2013 the Vertes Commission judicial enquiry into queue jumping in Alberta
provided a rare platform for discussing how routine processes and structures in
Canadian health care lead to preferential and differential access. Vertes recommended
that the public system needed to standardise and strengthen wait list management
strategies, and referral triage and booking systems, including access via the emergency
departments to specialist care (the so-called ‘private patient path’); better deﬁnition of
queue jumping and protection for whistle blowers (Reid, 2017).
As in the UK NHS, piecemeal initiatives have not achieved a signiﬁcant,
sustained reduction in waiting times. According to the 2016 Commonwealth
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Fund international survey of 11 high-income countries, Canadians have the
longest wait for primary and specialist care, with 30%waiting more than 4 weeks
to see a specialist (Osborn et al., 2016).
Waiting lists, times and policy analysis frameworks
Three key policy lessons emerge from the history of waiting lists and times in the
United Kingdom. First, a failure to acknowledge and address tensions between
the different NHS policy levels (intra-/inter-regional and national) will affect the
relative success of performance management techniques. Second, radical policy
changes should be piloted, even if this is uncomfortable/risky for policymakers.
Third, conscious effort needs to be invested by policymakers in ensuring all expert
groups continue to be actively engaged in policy formation.
Culyer and Cullis made the ﬁrst serious proposal to meet expressed need for UK
NHS services by a comprehensive and transparent priority scoring system for
admission from waiting lists in 1976. They observed wide variations in NHS
performance at all levels: regions, districts, hospitals and individual clinicians.
More than 40 years later, there is still no ‘NHS-wide’ admissions system.
In the intervening period there have been several signiﬁcant policy initiatives:
intermittent injections of funding, use of targets and private sector capacity, shift
from focus on waiting list size to waiting time. There have been parallel, but not
always related, research initiatives, the majority led by health economists, to dis-
tinguish demand and supply factors, but these have often been hampered by poor
data, or skewed by the personal academic research interests of those undertaking
the projects (and the implicit analytical framework has been Paretian – focussed
on welfare economics). Economists have been critical of policymakers for failing
to establish an explicit set of criteria against which to evaluate policy options, for
their failure to recognise the problems created by using targets (feedback effects,
perverse incentives) and their failure to be clear about whether the policy goal is
health service efﬁciency or equity (Cullis et al., 2000; Devlin et al., 2002a, 2002b;
Lewis and Appleby, 2008). They have been increasingly critical of the medical
profession, especially those clinicians who have resisted the introduction of
priority scoring indices. But these critiques ignore the subliminal, and usually
messy, nature of policy development. Few health economists have acknowledged
one of the main weaknesses of the UK (and NHS) policy culture, which is to
bypass pilot studies and to go for what Carolyn Tuohy calls the ‘big bangs’:
making whole system changes, as occurred with the introduction of the internal
market in 1991 (Tuohy, 2017a).
Discussion of, and responses to, waiting lists and waiting times has varied since
1948. There is a correlation not only between increasing waiting and amount of
discussion, but also with the improvement and accessibility of statistics. In the
early years of the NHS the scale of the problem was reported annually, and it was
not easy to ascertain the extent of variation within the NHS. Local waiting list
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issues, as in Cardiff in 1954, initially triggered local responses. It was not until a
single, ‘national’ waiting list ﬁgure was produced that national policy solutions
were considered and/or attempted. Even then, there have been issues with what is
deemed relevant to collect statistics for: waiting for inpatient treatment has been
only part of the picture (and did not include those patients booked at time of
decision to treat), but it was not until 1986 that information on waiting for out-
patient appointments was collected, and 2005 that policies speciﬁcally addressed
‘Referral to Treatment’, or the whole ‘patient pathway’ were introduced.
Reliability – or rather malleability – of statistics for waiting lists and times
appears to have been responsive to political pressures. Hospitals were found to be
mis-reporting their performance from the 1960s onwards. Even in the 2000s there
were problems with evaluating hospital level performance, amid concerns of
clinicians and managers ‘gaming’ the system, and government reluctance to deﬁne
the ‘elective care’ they were measuring (Harrison and Appleby, 2009; Findlay,
2017). Clinician-level performance data poses another set of ideological chal-
lenges. Relativity has also been an important factor: both within and between the
NHS regions and, since the 1999 devolution of health care, between the four UK
nations. This opened up new analytical possibilities for health economists and other
researchers, whowere now able to compare, for example, the use of targets (England)
with no targets/or rankings (Scotland and Wales) (Hauck and Street, 2007; Propper
et al., 2008; Bevan, 2010).
Addressing both national and local waiting list and waiting time issues has been
a chronic source of tension in the UK NHS. Repeated local studies demonstrated
that it was difﬁcult to attribute blame to single factors, or to clear disparities
between supply and demand. At a national level, the history of waiting lists and
times helps to illuminate key policy issues. First, the spectrum of ministerial
determination and capacity for policy change: from Enoch Powell’s recognition of
the futility of effort in the 1960s; Barbara Castle’s bravado in 1974 and 2 years
later David Ennal’s timid climb-down in the face of robust medical profession
defence of their clinical autonomy. In the 1980s and 1990s ﬂuctuations in waiting
lists and times became sticks with which opposition parties could beat the
incumbent Secretary of State for Health (especially Frank Dobson in 1998); others
resisted setting such clear national targets, and put the spotlight on local imple-
mentation. See, for example, Virginia Bottomley’s comment in 1994 that ‘we only
set the framework …’ (Klein et al., 1996: 131).
In policy analysis frameworks, these historical ﬂuctuations in political strength
align well with John Kingdon’s (1995) Multiple Streams Analysis. They also
resonate with Carolyn Tuohy’s (1999, 2017a, 2017b) evolving analysis, in which
she identiﬁes four types of policy change: big bang, blueprints, mosaics and
incremental. These reﬂect the magnitude of change: its scale and pace, as well as
how political actors individually and collectively assess their current and future
political inﬂuence. Tuohy’s resultant ‘strategic domains’ enhance Kingdon’s
approach by identifying not just when the ‘policy windows’ open, but when they
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are used (and not used). In the history of waiting lists and times, there have been
few clear ‘windows of opportunity’ when government ministers had the option to
impose radical change on the medical profession, such as a national priority
scoring system for hospital admissions. They had the research evidence this was
effective from 1976, but continued to pursue an ‘incremental’ strategy, hoping
clinicians would adopt good practice through choice. This could also be seen as
evidence to support David Wilsford’s (1994) concept of ‘path dependency’: that it
becomes progressively harder to achieve signiﬁcant policy change as tradition
embeds practices. The ongoing signiﬁcant variations in clinical output and waiting
times did not appear to be seen by politicians as sufﬁciently strong justiﬁcation to
trigger radical policy shifts (perhaps because these had been adopted into theNHS on
its formation in 1948). The policy choice was to use waiting list/time targets instead
(and rankings in Scotland and later in Wales), which were focussed on hospital
managers rather than to attempt direct engagement with the medical profession.
Here, Paul Sabatier’s (1988) Advocacy Coalition theory also has explanatory
potential. Government ministers increasingly looked to form alliances with
alternative sources of policy expertise. Their engagement with health economists
was ‘incremental’, in Tuohy’s language, from the 1960s, through isolated research
commissions, until the formation of DHSS Economic Advisers’Ofﬁce in 1969 and
centres such as the University of York Centre for Health Economics (founded in
1983) which, acting together as commissioner and consultancy service, provided a
series of potentially inﬂuential research reports that linked waiting lists and times
with evidence of weak and inequitable clinical practices, especially on admissions
systems. This ‘advocacy coalition’ suited both parties: government ministers
beneﬁted from a new authoritative voice which justiﬁed rationing access to the
NHS by time; the health economics community beneﬁted from an increased sense of
professional identity and security. As this coalition matured, it permitted a subtle
(and sometimes not so subtle) distancing of the government from the medical
profession. Yet the strength of the politician/health economist coalition never
seriously challenged the authority of the individual clinician/patient coalition, which
trumped any national imposition of standardised management of waiting lists.
Waiting list and waiting time policies are some of the earliest forms of target
setting within health services: implicit until the 1980s, and then progressively
exposed through the New Public Management reforms and, in the UK NHS, the
use of Performance Indicators (Bevan and Hood, 2006; Hood, 2007). They have
had clear local and national dimensions: often set centrally, but negotiated at
regional, district, hospital and even individual clinician levels. As targets, they can
help to expose synergies and tensions between ‘governance logics’. Hierarchist
governance – in which targets are imposed centrally – is often seen as mutually
exclusive to experimentalist governance, in which target setting can be used as
an active learning process, and the outcome of negotiations between central
regulators and local authorities (Wismar et al., 2008; Bevan, 2010; Schang and
Morton, 2017).
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Historical analysis of waiting lists and times – especially of sporadic manage-
ment initiatives such as increases in system capacity and use of ‘discretionary’
policies such as priority scoring indices for admissions – illuminates the relative
authorities resting at the local and national governance levels: the clinician, the
hospital manager, the regional director and ultimately the government minister. It
highlights how the dialogue between and within these groups has changed: from
concerns about ‘productivity’ to ‘need’ and ‘fairness’. While crude increases in
numbers of patients/time waiting for inpatient elective treatment can be taken as
evidence of under-resourcing; the extensive variations in waiting lists and times, in
referral practices and in clinician/hospital efﬁciency expose the ‘sub-national’
reality of the NHS in the United Kingdom. Nuanced historical analyses – which
lay bare the real dilemmas and battles of developing and implementing health
policy – offer a valuable analytical tool for contemporary policymakers.
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